When the "Kazakhstan Model" Shatters

Demonstrations, riots, clashes, public buildings burnt down, dismissal of the government and, finally, foreign military intervention: Kazakhstan, which for a long time was a model of stability in Central Asia, has just experienced the most turbulent week in its modern history. How can we understand this tumultuous episode and its consequences for the country and for the entire post-Soviet space?

The Return of the “Great Game”

Since gaining independence thirty years ago with the fall of the USSR, the five Central Asian republics - Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan - have been largely ignored in Europe. However, this region has experienced a turbulent life of civil wars (Tajikistan), ethnic conflicts (between Uzbeks and Kyrgyz), and violent revolutions (Tulip Revolution, in 2005 in Kyrgyzstan) over the past three decades.

It has also quickly become a field of competition between great powers. Russia wants above all to see stability and order in the area, which borders Afghanistan and is a centre for drug trafficking and terrorism. The United States, on the other hand, saw the emergence of new states in Central Asia as an opportunity to extend its economic and military influence and, especially from the start of its intervention in Afghanistan in 2001, to install military bases or, at a minimum, to use existing ones. China and Turkey have emerged more recently.

The EU's role in the region has always been limited. Brussels did launch a “European Union – Central Asia” program in 2007, but it lacked funding and concrete projects.

Kazakhstan, A Success Story in the Heart of Central Asia?

Kazakhstan has always played a special role in the region. The country has the largest territory after Russia in the post-Soviet space (2,724,902 km²), inhabited by almost 19 million citizens (second largest by population in Central Asia after Uzbekistan and its 35.5 million), predominantly Muslim (70%), predominantly ethnic Kazakh (63% Kazakh, 23% Russian), and has very rich natural resources.

Kazakhstan ranks 11th in the world in terms of oil reserves, and 22nd in terms of gas reserves (3rd in the CIS space, after Russia, and Turkmenistan). Kazakhstan's energy resources supply its neighbors – Uzbekistan and China –, but also European countries such as Italy, the Netherlands, Switzerland. Kazakhstan produces coal which is bought by Russia, Ukraine, China, Belarus, Poland. Almost the entire Mendeleev's periodic table can be found in its subsoil, and the country benefits from this: it sells a lot of iron, chromium, ferro-alloys, steel, copper, aluminum, zinc, lead.

In addition, the vast territories of Kazakhstan are of global strategic importance for international trade transport networks. The EU's "Transport Corridor Europe-Caucasus-Asia" (TRACECA), the "Western Europe-Western China", which will link Liányúngǎng in China to St. Petersburg in Russia by road, the "North-South" corridor, which establishes connections between Russia, Kazakhstan, Iran and India, and finally the Chinese New Silk Road project are vital for trade on the Eurasian continent.

Until the end of 2021, Kazakhstan was considered the most dynamic and developed country in Central Asia. It attracted foreign investment and managed to collaborate simultaneously with several different international actors – such as Russia, China, Europe, United States, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, and so on – but becoming heavily dependent on any of them. The country was proud of the success of its so-called “multi-vector” foreign policy.

An “Enlightened” Authoritarianism That Seemed Solid

After of the Soviet era, Kazakhstan, like all its neighbours, established a system of regime of electoral autocracy. Nursultan Nazarbayev, who was already in power during the Soviet period, led the country from 1991, asserting himself as the father of a strong and independent state. In 2010, the parliament granted him the status of "leader of the nation for life" (Yelbasy in Kazakh): this was the beginning of a personality of Nazarbayev's personality that has been growing over the past decade. Streets, universities, mosques, government programs, and even the country's capital have been named after the Yelbasy – thus the capital Astana became Nur-Sultan in 2019.

Despite its obvious authoritarianism – prosecution of opponents, restriction of freedom of the press, no independent courts – the regime of Kazakhstan presented itself on the international scene as a relatively open country. It collaborated with international organizations, American and European NGOs could work there – which is no longer the case in Russia and Belarus, for example – and investors were able to develop projects.

In 2019, at the age of 79, Nazarbayev implemented a transfer of power: the new president, Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, proposed and supported by the Yelbasy , was elected in 2019. But Nazarbayev ensured that he retained his political influence: he was appointed head of Kazakhstan's Security Council with wide-ranging prerogatives, and continued to lead the ruling party, ruling party, Nur-Otan ("Sun of the Fatherland").

The transfer of Kazakh authoritarian power was seen as exemplary among non-democratic post-Soviet countries: it demonstrated the possibility of peaceful continuity and stability of electoral autocracies… until 2 January 2022.

What Happened ?

In a few days the country plunged into a chaos of violent demonstrations, riots and massive looting that the local police failed to stop. Among other things, the demonstrators attacked the monuments of Yelbasy, which was still revered everywhere yesterday. The legitimacy of Kazakhstan's power, based on simulated and orchestrated elections, proved to be fragile and illusory.

The Kazakh authorities have cut have cut off all telephone and Internet connections in the country. Even today, .kz websites are not accessible to Internet users. The reconstruction of the events that took place between 2 and 6 January is open to debate. Below is a chronology, followed by the main interpretations that can be made of this crisis.

January 2. Following a doubling in the price of liquefied gas, which is widely used by Kazakhstanis to fuel their cars and heat their homes, demonstrators block the streets in Zhanaozen, in south-western Kazakhstan, near the Caspian Sea.

January 3. About a thousand demonstrators gather in the central square of Zhanaozen. Residents of the nearby town of Aktaou also took to the streets. Workers at oil plants in southwestern Kazakhstan announce the possibility of a strike. Demonstrations spread to several Kazakh cities - Almaty, Aktyube, Karaganda, Chymkent, Kokchetaou, Uralsk, and the capital Nur-Sultan.

January 4. The government announced a reduction in the prices for liquefied gas in the southwestern region of Kazakhstan. Demonstrators continued to take to the streets throughout the country, with demands that went beyond the gas price issue to include inequality, impoverishment and the political situation.

January 5. Special forces use stun grenades and tear gas against demonstrators in Almaty (the former capital, the country's most populous city, and still its economic and scientific centre). The demonstrators became more violent: they attacked the police and burned buildings. Tokayev issued a decree ordering a state of emergency in south-west Kazakhstan and Almaty.

The same day, he announced the resignation of the government, stripped Nazarbayev of the role as head of the Security Council, dismissed the director of the KNB, close to Nazarbayev (the counterpart of the Russian FSB) and announced political reforms.

The riots are beyond government control. Nearly 400 police officers were injured (there is no reliable information on civilian casualties at present, although there are reports of at at least 160). In Almaty, demonstrators stormed the city hall, set fire to the presidential residence, and seized the airport and police headquarters. Shots were fired in several Kazakh cities.

In the evening, President Tokayev officially called for the intervention of troops from the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO, including Russia, Armenia, Belarus, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Kazakhstan).

January 6. Armed attacks by demonstrators continued, particularly in Almaty. In the early evening, the national police began to restore order in Kazakh cities. In the evening, Russian troops began to arrive in Kazakhstan.

From January 7, the situation in the country stabilized. Nearly 4,000 demonstrators are arrested. 10 January was declared a day of mourning in Kazakhstan.

As can be seen, the events of early January unfolded quickly and left many questions unanswered. The crisis in Kazakhstan is quite symptomatic for electoral autocracies in the post-Soviet space, including Russia, so it is important to understand how it unfolded, as well as its consequences for Kazakhstan itself and for the post-Soviet space in general.

Different Interpretations

Analysts close to the Kremlin as well as the Russian government have interpreted this crisis as a kind of color revolution, which they say is still inspired by the West to "destabilize legitimate power" in post-Soviet countries.

President Tokayev himself said that 20,000 foreign terrorists had entered the country and tried to overthrow the government. However, there is no evidence for this claim and the President quickly deleted the tweet that claimed this. Moreover, no evidence of external interference has so far been presented to the public. It can be seen that the alleged threat of terrorist invasion was used by President Tokayev to justify the arrival of Russian troops in a situation where he was not in full control of his own country's law enforcement agencies.

Other experts (especially Kazakh opponents) claim that there was a popular revolt provoked by the injustice of the established authoritarian regime in Kazakhstan. According to them, the violence in the streets is explained by the degree of discontent of the Kazakh people and their fear of a Russian invasion in the name of saving the regime.

However, in view of all the events in Kazakh cities and the actions of President Tokayev, another picture emerges. The crisis of early 2022 appears to be a combination of a popular revolt and a conflict between Kazakh elites. This view is shared by moderate Kazakh experts, international experts and independent Russian experts.

According to them, based on all the facts we have now, the crisis began with spontaneous demonstrations that were provoked by economic and political reasons and were obviously not inspired or organised by the West. Kazakhstan has already experienced several such protests (e.g. those of 2011 and 2016) and Kazakhs are becoming increasingly politically active.

The protests earlier this year were used by the Nazarbayev clan, unhappy with Tokayev's ambitions to take more power in the country (indeed, since Nazarbayev's resignation, power in the country remained largely in the hands of his clan). They mobilized forces that experts call "Nazarbayev's private army" (which was created to protect the clan in case of danger); at the same time, the head of the KNB was able to take control of part of the Kazakh police and military (CNN has already revealed the sources confirming this hypothesis).

This explains the inaction of the latter who often fled and sometimes helped the demonstrators. This is why the head of the KNB was quickly stripped, then arrested and imprisoned a few days ago for treason. The geography of the violence that began on the night of 4-5 January also corresponds to the dislocation of the forces supporting Nazarbayev's clan – essentially southern Kazakhstan.

Thus, by the morning of 5 January, President Tokayev was not only confronted with the demonstrators – who were mostly aggressive but not violent – ​​but at the same time had to counter the looters and the armed groups defending the Nazarbayev clan. The latter acted like trained soldiers, which explains the success of their assaults on government buildings and Almaty airport. In this situation, Tokayev had no choice but to ask for help from outside.

Resorting to the Russian army was a very risky move for him and betrayed his desperation, both in the face of the risk of losing his power to a rival clan, and in the face of the likely chaos caused by the refusal of the Kazakhs to accept the return of Nazarbayev's clan (the first fear being obviously more important to Tokayev).

Tokayev was well aware of the dissatisfaction of his fellow citizens with his decision to call in the Russian soldiers (technically he asked for the CSTO, but this organization is directed and financed by Russia and in the end it was 2,500 Russian soldiers who landed on Kazakh ground, the other countries of the alliance having sent, after some resistance, 100 soldiers). This dissatisfaction is explained in particular by the mistrust of Moscow, which has been widely inculcated in the national narrative developed since independence, where the Russians are presented as invaders who played a generally negative role in the history of Kazakhstan.

Today, it can be seen that the Tokayev government was able to regain control of the situation around 6 January, before the arrival of Russian troops. Nevertheless, Russian support influenced the course of the crisis and dissuaded Nazarbayev's clan from continuing the riots. On 10 January, Tokayev announced the departure of Russian troops in the shortest possible time.

What Foreign Influences?

It is important to mention the role of other foreign actors in this crisis. China may have played an important but discreet role. Some sources believe that it was its contacts in the Chinese government that allowed the Kazakh regime to cut off access to social media in the country. Moreover, China was annoyed by the arrival of Russian troops in the middle of the crisis: pro-Kremlin Telegram channels (for example the "Nezygar" channel) even claimed that the Chinese would have been ready to send their troops as well.

Turkey, which invests heavily in its relations with Kazakhstan and in particular in the training of its elites, also expressed its disappointment with Tokayev's decision in only Russian troops. Turkey convened an extraordinary meeting of the Organization of Turkic States on 11 January, at which member states stressed both the importance of order in the country and the need for reform.

Since its independence, Kazakhstan has relied on a multi-vector strategy in order to maintain a balance between several international powers. National identity was forged and affirmed, new economic and intellectual elites emerged and, with the support of the people, demanded their place in Kazakh politics. At the same time, the political system inherited from Soviet practices has not evolved sufficiently with society. And, as in other electoral autocracies in the post-Soviet space, the legitimacy of power in Kazakhstan, based on orchestrated elections, has revealed its fragility and instability.

Naturally, the lesson of Kazakhstan will be learned by similar neighboring regimes: in the short term it will push the leaders of these regimes to harden their internal policies, but in the long term it may reveal the contours of potential crises in other electoral autocracies.