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Abstract:
Morocco has recently embarked on a new geopolitical journey marked by expansion and new strategic alliances, such as those with the United States and Israel, which help shape the country's new diplomatic ambitions. As the Kingdom seizes various opportunities to strengthen its domestic and external relations, the implications of this new trajectory will be felt in the region, on the continent and beyond. However, since its ambition to include the Tropic seamount in its continental shelf extension overlaps with that of the Spanish one, this could potentially complicate both countries' relations in the long term.
Keywords:
Phosphate, Security dilemma, Rearmament, Food Security, Tropic Seamount
Introduction
<<Morocco is a bridge between Europe and Africa and a crossroads of civilizations>> [1].
In recent years, Morocco has undergone a major geopolitical shift due to its active
participation in regional and international affairs. With a more assertive foreign policy, a novel strategy of economic development and modernization of the country, as well as its efforts to strengthen ties with other African countries through cooperation projects, all favor the continent.
The Kingdom of Morocco has achieved important diplomatic triumphs by benefiting, in this regard, from its security and defense alliances with the United States and Israel. The former provides military aid and training to the country, and both maintain a close security vision. The latter, also known for its advanced military technology and expertise, already cooperates with the Kingdom of Morocco and could help it enhance its military capabilities. Another
of Morocco's aspirations is the mastery of the expected upcoming Green Revolution, essential for manufacturing electric cars or solar panels, hence its aspiration to expand its continental shelf to include the Tropic seamount, the hidden treasure.
However, the security dilemma that exists in the region somewhat hinders the country's new development strategy. Morocco, which maintains strong ties with the West and the Arab world, sees itself as a stabilizing force in the region, although the latter issue generates much debate. Tensions and mistrust arising from historical, political or territorial disputes, such as the Western Sahara conflict, contribute to destabilizing the region in the eyes of the European Union.
The Geography of Morocco's Imagination
The geography of Morocco's imagination refers to how its inhabitants perceive and
imagine the country's unique cultural, historical and geographical characteristics and how they want to project it to the world. This concept includes the country's rich cultural heritage and its role as a crossroads of different civilizations. Morocco's identity is therefore not only determined by its physical geography, but also by how it is imagined and represented elsewhere, i.e. in literature, art, cinema and popular culture.
After its independence in 1956 [2] and with the death of Sultan Mohammed V, his heir Hassan II revived the mystical dream of building the "Greater Morocco". This concept was conceived in 1944 by Mohamed Allal el-Fassi, founder of the Istiqlal Party [3]. The "Greater Morocco" covered an area of 2 million km 2 (four times the territory of the country), sparsely populated but rich in natural resources and of great strategic interest, including a part of northwestern Mali, all of Mauritania, part of the Algerian desert and the Spanish colonies - Tarafaya, Ifni, Western Sahara - and the possessions on the Mediterranean coast - Ceuta and Melilla, the Peñón Vélez de la Gomera and Alhucemas rock, Parsley Island and the Chafarinas islands - [4].
Three months after independence, Allal el-Fassi published a map with the claimed
regions in the Istiqlal Party's newspaper, Al Amal, [Figure 1]. This strategy [5] was adopted by King Mohammed V since 1946 and his successors Hassan II and Mohammed VI as a guideline for the Kingdom of Morocco's foreign policy. The Moroccan government made it clear that the 1958 delimitation of its border with the Spanish Sahara was not to be interpreted as a renunciation of any of the aforementioned territorial claims; and shortly thereafter a "consultative commission" was set up to address the border issue. In 1959, Crown Prince Hassan II assured the French envoy that Mauritania would be free to determine its future; however, after its independence in 1960, Moroccan claims were revived, and
since then there has been a climate of tension surrounding the Western Sahara dilemma [6]. Thus, the recovery of Morocco's natural unity was (and still is) linked to the contestation of the zones and enclaves created by colonialism in the 19th and 20th centuries. However, this movement was never made official and today the territorial claims [7] do not refer to the concept of "Greater Morocco".
It is important to note that before the conquest of Algiers by France in 1830, there were no borders as we know them today in North Africa. Only geographical barriers and traditional border lines separated the various communities. Thus, throughout its long history as a sovereign state, Western concepts of country or nation hardly applied to Morocco. In fact, its temporary Berber rulers, who later converted to Islam and married Arabs, never felt the need to precisely define their region because it was a community of believers rather than a defined territory [8]. Morocco's complex history, in which numerous ethnic groups occupied the region over the centuries, has resulted in a rich and diverse human heritage. Prior to the
Arab invasion, the Berbers were the first indigenous inhabitants of northwest Africa, and Morocco's hybrid population, like that of other nations in the region, reflects this. The notion of Morocco is complex because beneath its outward homogeneity, there is a web of relationships that are continually connected and interconnected. As a result of its extensive mobility, the country has
developed a migratory culture that has given rise to three generations with distinct
mentalities and capacities to adapt to novel and challenging scenarios [9].
New Strategic Alliances
Morocco's complex sense of identity is accompanied by new strategic alliances that together are helping to shape the country's new geopolitical trajectory. The Kingdom of Morocco's diplomacy has in recent years developed significant economic and political activity on the African continent, which is leading it to change its status quo in the region. It has been doing so quietly, but recently that silence has begun to make a lot of noise. In short, Morocco has decided to step on the gas and the United States and Israel have not been left out of this geopolitical game board.
The U.S. role in the military rearguard in Morocco
The interests of Morocco and the United States coincide to some extent: while the former wants to play the role of regional gendarme in Africa, the latter needs a forward base in Afro-Asia, which translates into the possession of bases and storage facilities. To understand this process of US reconversion towards Morocco, one must take into account Washington's growing interest, to be discussed later, in Moroccan phosphates and the uranium they contain, whose reserves are estimated at 57.8 million tons, i.e. Morocco possesses an alarming 70% of the world's known phosphate reserves (this official estimate includes phosphate from Western Sahara) [10].
On the other hand, the Moroccan government has recently pursued an intense rearmament policy. If we analyze the evolution of the country's military expenditure during the last year 2020 [Figure 2], it increased to over $4.8 billion. What is interesting in this analysis is that most of the military hardware comes from the United States, with Rabat being the largest purchaser within the 53 countries of the U.S. Africa Command [11]. Moreover, in October 2021, Rabat strengthened its ties with Washington with the signing of an agreement that they describe as historic: the "Roadmap for Defense Cooperation 2020-2030 between the Kingdom of Morocco and the United States of America" which will facilitate, even more, the sales of arms and military materiel [12].
One of the main pillars of Morocco's foreign policy is to enhance its regional and
international role by promoting stability and security in the MENA (Middle East and North Africa) region. With all this, Morocco could come to spearhead the U.S. strategy in North Africa. A clear example of this is the role it is playing in U.S. Military Command Africa (AFRICOM) interoperability exercises, which, together with U.S. arms purchases, allows it to aspire to compete regionally and expand its influence over other participating nations [13]. However, this objective could have alarming consequences for the region, thus increasing the existing security dilemma with its neighbor, Algeria.
The bulk of African Lion 22', the 2022 edition of AFRICOM's largest and most important annual exercise, was executed mainly in Morocco, but also in Ghana, Senegal and Tunisia [14]. These maneuvers, with the participation of about 7,500 military personnel from the thirteen participating countries such as Italy, France, Brazil or the United Kingdom took part. However, Spain was absent, as in the previous edition, since the exercises coincided with the diplomatic crisis between the Kingdom of Spain and the Kingdom of Morocco [15]. In fact, it is difficult to foresee whether Spanish forces will join the exercises in the future. The Western Sahara issue has long been a sensitive issue in bilateral relations between the
two countries and remains unresolved to this day. At present, Spain is not among the countries participating in African Lion, and its collaboration would also be subject to various political, diplomatic and strategic factors of defense and security and the interest to cooperate with the United States and other countries.
Although there have been speculations and rumors about Morocco's possible exclusion from the exercise due to political and diplomatic disagreements, according to recent sources, all indications are that Morocco will participate in African Lion 2023 and its planning is proceeding apace [16]. There are several factors influencing this decision. The first stems from Morocco's strategic importance as a key U.S. ally in North Africa and the Middle East. The African Lion exercises demonstrate the strength of military cooperation between the two, making it a valuable partner in international security operations. It should also be noted that in recent years Morocco has adopted a roadmap for the modernization of military equipment, with France and the U.S. as the main suppliers [17].
Secondly, China's growing presence in the North and West African regions could be another factor influencing this decision. In recent years, Morocco has developed close ties with China, including important trade and investment agreements. As a result, both the United States and other Western allies are reportedly showing interest in maintaining a strong presence in the region to counter Beijing's influence.
Cooperation with the State of Israel
The White House's decision to recognize Morocco's sovereignty over Western Sahara [18], a territory in dispute between Rabat and the Polisario Front, brought with it a condition: the normalization of diplomatic relations with the State of Israel.
In part, this Moroccan-Israeli relationship also arose from the large number of Jews who inhabited Morocco before the birth of Israel in 1948, many of whom would later emigrate there, constituting one of the largest parts of the Israeli population: about one million Israelis are either from Morocco or descended from Moroccans, creating a deep and permanent bond with Rabat. Perhaps the most interesting issue, however, is that behind the normalization of these diplomatic ties lie more than six decades of close secret military and intelligence cooperation. This is explained in an article published by The New York Times [19], which offers a balanced explanation of the historical, political and strategic factors and how they have led to the improved relations between the two.
The paradox lies in the fact that this historical fact goes against the political and cultural traditions of the countries of the MENA region, which has caused some controversy in some sectors of Arab society. Morocco has not withdrawn its support for the just Palestinian cause of liberation from occupation and the establishment of an independent state [20], but it is playing both sides of the fence for a strategic reason: it wants to reassert itself as a regional power. To this end, the Kingdom of Morocco is working to strengthen its economic ties with other countries and is actively seeking to attract foreign investment and promote its own businesses and industries on the world stage, and one among them is Israel.
This has resulted in a series of agreements and initiatives in areas such as security and defense, technology, as well as cooperation in commercial and tourism projects. Only eleven months after the normalization of diplomatic relations, a memorandum of understanding was signed that includes defense collaboration between the two countries. This was an unprecedented agreement in the Arab world that laid the foundation for all future security cooperation between Israel and Morocco: it facilitated the sale of advanced Israeli weapons and defense systems to Rabat [21]. Now, the defense ministries and armed forces of both countries can easily communicate and share intelligence, whereas in the past it was only possible through their respective intelligence services.
In addition, the Moroccan Ministry of Energy, Mines and Environment granted the Israeli oil company Ratio Petroleum an official concession to explore and prospect in the controversial Dakhla waters in search of hydrocarbon deposits [22]. This Israeli-Moroccan agreement was announced a month before the military cooperation agreement. As the company explains on its website, Rabat awarded it a large study and research area called the Dakhla Atlantique block, located off the coast of the Atlantic Ocean about 200 kilometers from the Canary Islands [Figure 3]. Currently, the corporation owns 100% interest in the block and as long as the agreement remains in force, the company will act as operator. In addition, according to the provisions of Moroccan law, Rabat would receive a 7% royalty if oil is discovered at a depth of more than 200 meters, with a production of more than 500,000 tons, and in the case of gas resources, a 3.5% royalty for a production of more than 500,000 tons [23].
Apart from the close friendly cooperation in Moroccan-Israeli relations, it should be noted that Israel's position in the Eastern Mediterranean and its interests in Europe have increased the desire for agreements with countries in the region such as Cyprus, Greece and Turkey [24]. Some countries, such as Algeria, have interpreted this as a threat to their security and this has increased tensions in the region.
Interests of other stakeholders in the area
Recently, Morocco brought back to the forefront the question of the Eastern Sahara, the areas in southwestern Algeria, including Tindouf, which France once ceded to Algiers and which Morocco claims were historically Moroccan [25]. The motives behind this decision could also be related to its desire to strengthen its position in the Maghreb. However, the delicate situation in the reclaimed areas has opened the front with some countries of the European "Quad" such as Germany [26], France or Spain, and other international actors. Nevertheless, European countries remain important trading partners in the Maghreb economy and the links created by geographical proximity and migration between the two coasts play a vital role. In this sense, the Maghreb strongly impacts on its northern neighbors - as we could observe in the Spanish-Moroccan crisis of 2021 - and the latter, and the EU as a whole, also remain relevant for their southern partners. What happens is that they share protagonism with other international actors such as China, Russia and/or Turkey in the area.
In this reality, Algeria feels comfortable because such a climate of international
competition gives it more room for maneuver. But even a country like Morocco with a marked Atlantic and European orientation understands that it must diversify its international alliances to protect its own interests [27]. Spain, for its part, can play a constructive role in this context by promoting dialogue between Algeria and Morocco and working to foster a peaceful and sustainable solution to their rivalry. To do so, it would need to work with other countries in the region and the international community, such as the EU and the UN, to foster cooperation and understanding between Morocco and Algeria. However, given that Spanish-Algerian relations are currently "frozen" [28] this mediation role could result in an awkward or disadvantageous position for Spain.
Newly Emerging African Power?
The importance of phosphates
According to projections in the Generation 2030/Africa report, the continent's population is expected to double by 2050 [29]. However, the African continent holds vast agricultural potential to supply food for this population explosion and Morocco has a strategic resource for this purpose: phosphate, an essential resource for high agricultural production in the global fertilizer industry, which plays an important role in food security.
Morocco (including Western Sahara), is the Jupiter [30] of the accessible world reserves of phosphate rock [Table 1] because these are estimated at 70% (sources mention 3/4 of the global). In addition, phosphates account for approximately 5% of GDP and 20% of exports from Morocco, which together with China and the USA account for most of the world's supply. It is important to highlight several aspects that favor the Kingdom of Morocco. Firstly, the mining company in charge of phosphate mining and phosphoric acid and fertilizer manufacturing, OCP Group, [31] is state-owned. Second, the Khouribga mine is the world's largest open-pit phosphate mine, producing 35 billion tons of phosphate per year [32]. And
finally, Morocco is carrying out joint venture projects in African countries and by 2024, OCP Group expects to have a fertilizer plant in Ghana and an ammonia plant in Nigeria operational [33].
These data demonstrate that the Kingdom of Morocco's monopoly on this resource plays an important role because it has major implications for future food dynamics and availability. The availability of the phosphorus mineral is relevant because it is a key component for fertilizer production and is therefore vital to maintain a level of agricultural production capable of ensuring sufficient and affordable food supplies [34].
Although there is no imminent shortage of phosphate rock, there is a risk of price
volatility and supply disruptions as there are no substitutes for it [35] and its concentration is in a limited number of countries as we can see in Table 1. This situation generates alarming consequences, as its growing demand further pronounces monopolistic tendencies. Some analysts predict that Morocco's market share could increase to 80-90% of global phosphate demand by 2030. In addition, sources familiar with the country's plans also suggest that current production is intentionally kept intentionally below capacity in preparation for a larger market share in the future. A control of these percentages of global supply could create a situation in which the Moroccan state-owned company OCP exhibits price-setting behavior, although this scenario is highly dependent on new phosphate exploration, recovery and reuse projects, as well as the potential for strategic cooperation with Morocco [36].
In order to be able to carry out intensive agriculture, the soil must be fertilized with phosphorus, potassium and nitrogen. While the first two can be extracted in the form of salts, nitrogen fertilizer is produced through a very laborious process from nitrogen in the air and hydrogen. The main raw material for producing nitrogenous materials is natural gas because it is the source of ammonia, a crucial product of the most widely used fertilizers in agriculture [37]. However, the problem is that the production of hydrogen requires large quantities of natural gas, and due to the current conflict in Ukraine, gas prices have increased and so have the prices of nitrogen fertilizers [38]. Thus, we can understand the importance of controlling these natural resources, as they are a source of power and dominance that can be exploited for economic and political advantage.
From the EU, the dependence on imported fertilizers has prompted the union to
implement measures to ensure the availability of fertilizers for farmers, as well as their sustainable use [39]. This fact is related to the ideas of the philosopher and historian Ibn Khaldoun, who argued in his work Al-Muqaddima that the prosperity of a society depends largely on the "specialization and division of labor among its inhabitants" and not on the "amount of the stock of currency or precious metal". In a context of crisis and disorientation, the Arabic concept of asabiyyah that he introduces in his work is fundamental in offering a modern interpretation of classical political theology. The concept alludes to solidarity, group spirit, common will, etc. that strengthens all members of the community united in a shared effort to achieve the common goal of coexistence and order [40]. There is thus a certain asabiyyah in the EU that holds it together because implementing effective measures to address this need requires coordinated action and solidarity among member countries.
However, as the European Union's dependence on this Moroccan resource is expected to increase in the future, this makes relations with the neighboring country sensitive, not only because of the current status of Western Sahara, but also because of the political understanding between Morocco and Europe on various issues such as migration and fisheries [41].
South-South Cooperation: the Nigeria-Morocco Gas Pipeline
Algeria's decision to suspend gas supplies through the Gazoduc Maghreb Europe (GME), pipeline has reinforced Morocco's motivation to seek alternative sources of supply. The GME connects Hassi R'Mel (Algeria) with Spain by first passing through Morocco - where the extracted gas has been supplying the Tahaddart and Ain Beni Mathar power plants - and finally through the Strait of Gibraltar. Although in the short term Morocco can function without GME gas thanks to its coal-fired power plants and the growing renewable energy sector, in the long term gas will still be needed [42].
For the time being, Spain is re-exporting gas, from June 2022, to Morocco in reverse flow through the GME pipeline, marking the first direct flow of piped gas from Europe to Africa [43]. In April, Algeria was already threatening to terminate gas supply contracts to Spain, which are currently through the direct Medgaz pipeline, if Algerian gas was re-exported to Morocco. The threat has also prompted Spain to seek to develop a new gas origin certification system so that any molecules delivered to Morocco through the GME reverse flow pipeline can be shown to be non-Algerian [44]. Spain's strategic decisions to pass gas to its North African neighbor could also be related to fertilizer production, since, as mentioned above, nitrogen fertilizers require hydrogen from natural gas.
However, Morocco is working to change this situation. One of the planned projects of the gas industry development strategy is the Nigeria-Morocco Gas Pipeline (NMGP), a mega pipeline that could come close to supplying gas to Europe [Figure 4]. This project envisages the construction of a 5,600 km long pipeline that would extend the existing West African pipeline along the West African coast [45]. The NMGP, which would be the longest marine pipeline in the world, is intended to cross a large number of African countries offshore, starting from Brass Island (in the Niger Delta) to northern Morocco, where it would end up interconnecting the GME pipeline.
The pipeline would therefore not only supply gas to the 11 African countries that are connected to it, but would also allow gas to be transported to Spain and the rest of Europe [46]. By hosting its African component, Morocco aims to diversify its energy mix through mutually beneficial partnerships. In addition, the possibility of a new energy supply route from West Africa to Europe would decrease European dependence on Russian natural gas. Although this
project could take decades to complete, it comes at a time when European powers are increasingly hungry for new sources of gas in the wake of Russia's invasion of Ukraine [47]. The pipeline is expected to supply 5 million cubic meters of gas per day along the West African coast, benefiting 400 million people in the area. The challenge ahead is to connect this new pipeline to the GME, the pipeline that previously carried gas from Algeria to Spain via Morocco [48].
The proposed maritime proposal to transport gas from the Niger Delta could have a significant impact on the strategic decisions of Spain and Morocco. In other words, if built, it could change the dynamics of the natural gas and fertilizer market in the region and affect the way the Kingdom of Spain and the Kingdom of Morocco trade with each other and with other countries. However, given the technical and financial complexity of the project and concerns regarding the supply of natural gas available from Nigeria, the ambitious project remains a difficult challenge. Still, plans for the NMGP have moved forward and have
not been watered down despite skepticism, probably because it is a key component of King Mohammed VI's policy for South-South cooperation. Early estimates put the cost of this project at $25 billion and it would take 25 years to complete [49].
Similar concerns were raised at the time regarding the competing Trans-Saharan Gas Pipeline (TGSP) plan, a 4,128 km long pipeline, planned in the 1980s, from which Nigeria and Algeria would be connected, serving northern Nigeria and Niger en route to the Mediterranean coast. Unlike the NMGP, the TGSP would require an estimated investment of $20 billion and could be built in as little as three years [50].
Tropic Seamount: A future geostrategic problem?
One issue that could again hinder bilateral relations between Morocco and Spain in the future is the Tropic seamount, due to the aspiration of both countries to include it in their continental shelves.
The rare-earth elements required for low carbon technologies can be found in the
ferromanganese crusts of seamounts. However, as these harbor vulnerable marine
ecosystems (hereafter VMEs), it is important to manage the space to avoid conflicts between the preservation of seafloor biodiversity and mineral exploitation [51]. Numerous VMEs and significant levels of rare earth elements were found during a British exploration of Mount Tropic in late 2016 by scientists aboard the British research vessel James Cook. Mt. Tropic, which has attracted the attention of several geologists and biologists, is located in a marine area outside national jurisdiction and could contain enough cobalt to power 277 million electric cars and, enough tellurium to manufacture solar panels that could supply more than half of the electricity used in the UK [52].
When the huge concentrations of minerals such as tellurium, cobalt, copper and titanium, crucial for commercial development, were discovered within the deepwater ferromanganese nodules, Morocco was still paralyzed by the Western Sahara issue. But after former U.S. President Donald Trump unilaterally recognized the Kingdom of Morocco's sovereignty over Western Sahara on December 10, 2020, the country's efforts to expand its continental shelf have only grown. However, although Mount Tropic is currently in international waters, it is included in both Spanish and Moroccan proposals for an extended continental shelf and it seems that an underwater race to get to the bottom of this [53] has been unleashed.
In September 2019, the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), to which both countries are contracting parties, highlighted this undersea volcano for the existence of a large number of VMEs. Far from conserving these vulnerable marine ecosystems, the inclusion of Tropic in both proposals appears to be aimed at its mining [54].
The main element present there is tellurium, a component with excellent connectivity capabilities and necessary for the electronics industry sector [55] and which the European Union has designated as a strategic raw material [56]. Although current technology does not allow the extraction of the riches that are submerged in Tropic Mountain, these materials will be key in the expected Green Deal, essential to manufacture electric cars or solar panels.
At the beginning of February 2020, the Moroccan Government modified in a plenary session of Parliament two regulations on maritime borders: the declaration of 12 nautical miles (22 kilometers) of territorial waters and the 200 nautical miles (370 kilometers) of Exclusive Economic Zone along the coast of Western Sahara in order to claim sovereignty over them. With this measure, they aspire to request a further extension to 350 miles (648 kilometers) [Figure 5], which would allow them to claim, as Spain does, the Tropic seamount [57]. In this regard, Rabat revised the maritime borders based on geostrategic considerations to include the Atlantic coast opposite Western Sahara.
According to Article 76 of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, each State may apply to the UN to extend its continental shelf in order to extend its subsoil rights to 350 nautical miles in a regulated and justifiable manner. In the event of overlapping claims between States, the convention provides for negotiation and, in general, a median is established to separate the waters equitably. Otherwise, if there is no agreement, the case may be brought before an international tribunal [58].
Regarding this last point, Spain formally requested the United Nations to extend the territorial waters of the Canary Islands to 350 miles, alleging, with scientific reports, that the subsoil where Tropic is located corresponds geologically to the natural extension of the archipelago, since the seamount is located 499 km from the island of El Hierro [59]. The Moroccan aspiration, on the other hand, is not so convincing because the maritime area with which it is negotiating is not technically its own. According to the United Nations, Western Sahara remains a territory in the process of decolonization since 1960 and although Morocco occupied it in 1975 and the United States recognized it as part of Moroccan sovereignty in 2020, the UN opposes these claims.
Whatever the outcome, it is important to keep in mind that the Tropic seamount is part of the international seabed and ocean floor area, a collective legacy of humanity overseen by the International Seabed Authority (ISA). In other words, the Tropic does not belong to any State and in case it is exploited (when we acquire the technology to do so) it should be done following the guidelines of the ISA [60]. Furthermore, it is habitat and food source for millions of species (many of them still unknown) which makes it especially significant and vulnerable. If destroyed, this would have an impact not only on the seamount itself, destroying deep ecosystems of sponges and corals that can take thousands of years to develop, but also on migratory species of fish, whales and seabirds that use these seamounts as a breeding ground and food source [61].
Conclusions
Physical geography is an unalterable scenario in which states strive to shape strategies that are favorable to them and the Kingdom of Morocco is a clear example of this because it enjoys a unique geographical situation, being the closest African country to Europe and the only one of them that shares a land border with the European Union. This makes it a natural bridge between the two continents, and its proximity to the Mediterranean and the Atlantic Ocean gives it the potential to become a leading logistics hub in the region.
As the country embarks on its new geopolitical journey, it is presented with a unique opportunity to shape its geopolitical identity on the world stage and forge its relations with other countries. By taking a more inclusive and cooperative approach, Morocco is in an optimal position to exploit its inherent potential and enhance its regional and international economic possibilities. With ambitious projects such as the Nigeria-Morocco gas pipeline, the country could, in the long term, take the lead in the transport and distribution of natural gas to the European Union.
However, historical, political and territorial disputes with neighboring countries create an atmosphere of jealousy and competition that harms rather than benefits the region. The resulting security dilemma, characterized by a spiral of mistrust, could lead to increased tensions.
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Footnotes
[1] IFIMES. Morocco, Bridge Between Europe and Africa and Crossroads of Civilizations, Slovenian Think Tank | MapNews [online]. April 29, 2020 [accessed December 20, 2022]. Available at: https://www.mapnews.ma/en/actualites/politics/morocco-bridge-between-europe-and-africa-and-crossroads-civilizations-slovenian
[2] Embassy of the Kingdom of Morocco. " Cronología histórica de Marruecos". Embajada del Reino de Marruecos. http://www.embajada-marruecos.es/reino-de-marruecos/historia/ (accessed March 23, 2023).
[3] Founded in 1943, Istiqlal is a nationalist party, with a conservative tendency, which defends above all the territorial integrity of Morocco; the word "Istiqlal" means independence in Arabic. More information at: E. G. H. H. Joffé, "The
Moroccan Nationalist Movement: Istiqlal, the Sultan, and the Country," The Journal of African History, vol. 26, no. 4, pp. 289-307, 1985. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0021853700028759
[4] IGLESIAS, Marcela. Conflicto y cooperación entre España y Marruecos (1956-2008). Sevilla: Fundación Centro de Estudios Andaluces, 2010. p.276
[5] The main rival doctrines to this concept have been Saharawi nationalism, Mauritanian irredentism, Spanish nationalism, Berber separatism and pan-Arabism.
[6] REYNER, Anthony S., 1963, Morocco's International Boundaries: A Factual Background. The Journal of Modern African Studies. 1963. Vol. 1, no. 3p. 313–326. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022278X00001725. p.314
[7] Although references to the Spanish enclaves in North Africa have not disappeared, their claim appears transversally in the negotiations vis-à-vis with Spain on issues, not exclusively of territorial sovereignty, such as immigration, drug trafficking and smuggling, fishing agreements, etc.
[8] REYNER, Anthony S., 1963, Morocco's International Boundaries: A Factual Background… op. cit., p. 315
[9] RADI, Ahmed. Hybridity and the Strategies of Instability. Postcolonial and Postimperial Literature: An Overview [online]. May 2001 [accessed January 1, 2022]. Available at: http://www.postcolonialweb.org/poldiscourse/casablanca/radi2.html
[10] ARMENGOL, Vicenç Fisas., 1983, El contencioso con Marruecos y el futuro estratégico de España. Afers Internacionals, no.1, 1, 19–45. http://www.jstor.org/stable/40585181
[11] GINÉS SORIANO FORTE (INFODEFENSA.COM). Marruecos incrementa un 30% su gasto militar y recorta distancias con España. La Razón [online]. May 19, 2021 [accessed January 2, 2023]. Available at: https://www.larazon.es/espana/20210519/nto2vnbtxvfmvngrqonc4pq43i.html
[12] COLOM-PIELLA, Guillem. Marruecos el Estrecho de Gibraltar y la amenaza militar sobre España [online]. Instituto de Seguridad y Cultura, abril 2021 [accessed January 2, 2023]. Available at: https://www.academia.edu/48804665/Marruecos_el_Estrecho_de_Gibraltar_y_la_amenaza_militar_sobre_España
[13] COLOM-PIELLA, Guillem. Marruecos el Estrecho de Gibraltar y la amenaza militar sobre España… op. cit., p. 12
[14] "African Lion". United States Africa Command. https://www.africom.mil/what-we-do/exercises/african-lion [accessed March 9, 2023].
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[16] M. C. Bradley, "African Lion 23 Moves Ahead," U.S. Army, February 7, 2023. Accessed March 15, 2023. [Online].Available at:
[17] EFE. Spain will not participate this year in the maneuvers 'African Lion 22' in Morocco. El Periódico de España. June 2, 2022. Accessed April 1, 2023. [Online]. Available at: https://www.epe.es/es/politica/20220602/espana-maniobras-african-marruecos-13760200
[18] D. J. Trump. "Proclamation on Recognizing The Sovereignty Of The Kingdom Of Morocco Over The Western Sahara”. The White House Website. Available at: https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/presidential-actions/proclamation-recognizing-sovereignty-kingdom-morocco-western-sahara/ (accessed March 13, 2023).
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[41] DE RIDDER, Marjolein, et al. Risks and opportunities in the global phosphate rock market…op.cit. p.16
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[44] G. Baratti y S. E. Elliott, "Spain begins gas re-exports to Morocco via GME pipeline: Enagas”… op. cit.
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[54] SOLIS, Elena. Underwater Mining on Mount Tropic: Do You Really "Have to Exploit"?... op. cit.
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[57] ALONSO GUTIÉRREZ, Javier. Marruecos aprueba la ampliación de su frontera marítima hacia Canarias… op. cit.
[58] United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 1982.
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